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COMMENT
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MINNESOTA DATA
PRACTICES ACT AND THE MINNESOTA OPEN
MEETING LAW
[Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1989)]
INTRODUCTION
In a case of first impression,I the Minnesota Supreme Court re-
cently addressed the issue of whether the Minnesota Open Meeting
LaW2 prohibits a government meeting from being closed to the pub-
lic when information classified as nonpublic under the Minnesota
Government Data Practices Acts is discussed. In Annandale Advocate
v. City ofAnnandale,4 the supreme court held that it was proper for the
Annandale City Council to close a meeting when discussing "an in-
vestigative report regarding the alleged misconduct of Annandale's
chief of police." 5 This report was classified as nonpublic under an
exception to the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (Data
Practices Act) which provides "that all personnel data on public em-
ployees is private unless specifically listed otherwise."6
The supreme court stated in Annandale Advocate that even though
1. Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1989). Re-
spondent Annandale Advocate points out in its appellate brief to the Minnesota
Supreme Court that "proper interpretation of the statutory provisions that are at
issue has not been previously considered by this Court, and has received only limited
attention from the Court of Appeals." Brief for Respondent at 5, Annandale Advo-
cate v. City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1989) (No. CX-87-1583).
2. MINN. STAT. § 471.705 (1988). For a complete discussion of the Minnesota
Open Meeting Law, see infra notes 36-56 and accompanying text.
3. MINN. STAT. § 13.01-.90 (1988 & Supp. 1989). For a complete discussion of
the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act see infra notes 20-35 and accompany-
ing text.
4. 435 N.W.2d at 24.
5. Id. at 25. The investigative report was completed by a private law firm hired
by the City of Annandale to investigate allegations of misconduct against William
Ledwein, Chief of Police for the City of Annandale, Minnesota. The allegations arose
after Ledwein was indicted for reckless discharge of a handgun by a Wright County
grand jury. Id. Other allegations included alleged sexual misconduct involving
juveniles. Brief for Respondent at 3, Annandae Advocate, (No. CX-87-1583). See infra
notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
6. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 27. The personnel data exception in the
Data Practices Act for public employees is in MINN. STAT. § 13.43 (1988). See infra
notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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both the Data Practices Act and the Minnesota Open Meeting Law
(Open Meeting Law) adhere to a public policy of governmental
openness,7 personnel data of public employees does not become
public under the Data Practices Act until after the "final disposition
of [a] disciplinary proceeding"8 against an employee. The court de-
termined that, where a public employee has a right of review for dis-
missal or any other disciplinary action by an outside regulatory body,
the decision of a government officer or body to discharge the em-
ployee does not constitute a final disposition of a disciplinary pro-
ceeding.9 Rather, the decision of the public officer or governmental
body to discharge the employee constitutes only the final or last deci-
sion of that officer or body on the particular matter.' 0 The final dis-
position of the matter does not occur until there is a "last and final
determination of the matter itself."I In other words, a final disposi-
tion does not occur until all right of review and appeal on a matter is
exhausted.
As a result, the supreme court in Annandale Advocate held that the
Data Practices Act requires any investigative reports prepared on an
employee to remain private personnel data until the final disposition
of a disciplinary proceeding is reached. However, once a final dispo-
sition occurs, the result "and supporting documentation,"12 such as
an investigative report, must be released to the public. While this
reasoning is relatively straightforward, the problem arising in Annan-
dale Advocate is that a final disposition of the disciplinary action
against the Annandale Police Chief never occurred. Therefore, the
investigative report on the Police Chief will never be released.
A final disposition never occurred because the Police Chief re-
quested a Veterans Preference Board Hearing and, before the actual
hearing took place, he "agreed to resign in exchange for the city's
withdrawal of termination proceedings."13 This result is problem-
atic. It reveals a potential source of abuse: public employees appeal-
ing all decisions in disciplinary proceedings in an attempt to prevent
the decision and any supporting documentation from ever being re-
leased to the public-a result surely not intended by the legislature
when it enacted the Data Practices Act.
7. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 32. The supreme court states that "in
both the Open Meeting Law and the Data Practices Act, the legislature has indicated
that openness in government is an important public policy." Id.
8. Id. at 29.
9. Id. at 28. The decision of the government body to discharge or discipline the
employee is the final decision of only that tribunal. This decision may be subject to
appeal and therefore is not final. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
10. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 28.
11. Id.
12. MINN. STAT. § 13.43, subd. 2 (1988).
13. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 29.
[Vol. 16
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In addition to determining when the final disposition of a discipli-
nary action occurs, the supreme court in Annandale Advocate also de-
termined that it is proper for a city council to close a meeting to the
public when discussing an investigative report prepared on a public
employee before final disposition. In fact, the court held that a
meeting where such a report is discussed must be closed even though
the Open Meeting Law ordinarily requires city council meetings, as
well as other governmental meetings, to be open to the public. The
court reasoned that such meetings must be closed otherwise "the
protections given by the Data Practices Act [to the personnel data of
public employees would] become illusory"t4 when the public lis-
tened to the council discuss the personnel data supposedly protected
by the Act.
Annandale Advocate is significant because it settles a longstanding
conflict in Minnesota between the Data Practices Act and the Open
Meeting Law: whether it is proper to discuss data classified as non-
public by the Data Practices Act at an open meeting. In the past this
conflict between the two statutes has placed "municipal officials...
in the unenviable position of having to decide which law to vio-
late."15 According to the League of Minnesota Cities, an amicus cu-
riae in Annandale Advocate, many municipal officials have settled the
conflict in the past by closing meetings when nonpublic data is dis-
cussed because the penalty for a violation of the Open Meeting Law
is much less serious than for a violation of the Data Practices Act.16
While this case settles the past conflict between the Data Practices
Act and the Open Meeting Law, the supreme court noted that its
decision relied on statutes which "may be open to differing interpre-
14. Id. at 32.
15. Brief for Amicus Curiae The League of Minnesota Cities at 2, Annandale
Advocate v. City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1989) (No. CX-87-1583).
16. Id. The League of Minnesota Cities recognizes that often municipal officials
have resolved the conflict between the Data Practices Act and Open Meeting Law by
basing
their decisions on the respective penalty provisions of the two acts. Since
the Open Meeting Law carries only a $100 civil penalty and the Data Prac-
tices Act carries unlimited potential liability, many officials have decided to
close their meetings. Others have sought declaratory judgments simply to
protect themselves from the consequences of making a wrong decision,
Id. A person who violates the Open Meeting Law is "subject to personal liability in
the form of a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $100 for a single occurrence."
MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 2 (1988). Under the Data Practices Act, however, gov-
ernmental bodies, including political subdivisions, are liable for any damages sus-
tained by a person because of a violation of the Act, as well as up to $10,000 in
,exemplary damages for a willful violation. MINN. STAT. § 13.08, subd. 1 (1988). Fur-
thermore, any person who willfully violates the Data Practices Act "is guilty of a mis-
demeanor" and public employees are subject to "suspension without pay or dismissal
.... MINN. STAT. § 13.09 (1988).
1990)
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tations." 17 As a result, it is doubtful whether the court's decision will
provide a final resolution of this conflict. In fact, the court called on
the legislature to clarify both the Data Practices Act and the Open
Meeting Law if it disagreed with the court's interpretation of the two
statutes.' 8 The legislature quickly accepted the supreme court's invi-
tation to clarify both the Data Practices Act and the Open Meeting
Law. However, the legislature was unable to pass legislation amend-
ing either of the statutes during the 1989 session.' 9
I. HISTORY OF THE LAW INVOLVED
A. The Minnesota Government Data Practices Act
The Data Practices Act provides "[a]ll government data collected,
created, received, maintained or disseminated by a state agency,
political subdivision, or statewide system shall be public unless clas-
sified by statute .... or federal law, as nonpublic or protected non-
public, or with respect to data on individuals, as private or
confidential."20 With certain exceptions the Act creates a presump-
tion of public access to government data.21 The purpose of the Data
17. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 33.
18. Id. at 34.
19. The Legislature did pass a bill at the time of this article's publication which
appears to adopt in part many of the propositions contained in this article. However,
publication deadlines preclude this author from providing a more detailed analysis of
the new statute. See S.F. No. 1874, 77th Minn. Leg. 1990 (signed into law on May 3,
1990).
In addition to the attempt in the Minnesota Legislature to pass legislation to
clarify both the Data Practices Act and the Open Meeting Law, Annandale Advocate has
sparked much discussion in the legal community. See, e.g., Goldberg, Administrative
Law, 1989 MINN. ST. B.A. ADMIN. L. SEC. NEws 1 at 3, col. 2-4, col. 1 ("this opinion
will undoubtedly spawn both legislative and judicial action in the future.... For the
practitioner, this will be an area to watch closely. It is reasonable to expect continued
litigation and legislative proposals in the coming year."); Sections, 46 BENCH & B. OF
MINN. 31, 39 (May/June 1989) ("This Supreme Court decision has a major impact
upon the functioning of public bodies when they are holding meetings subject to the
Open Meeting Law, as well as when they are dealing with data which is other than
public under the Data Practices Act.").
20. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 1 (1988). In order to understand the Data Prac-
tices Act, it is first necessary to become familiar with some of the "jargon" used in the
Act. Under the Act, "government data" is defined as "all data collected, created,
received, maintained or disseminated by any state agency, political subdivision, or
statewide system regardless of its physical form, storage media or conditions of use."
§ 13.02, subd. 7 (1988). The Act defines a "political subdivision" as "any county,
statutory or home rule charter city, school district, special district and any board,
commission, district or authority created pursuant to law, local ordinance or charter
provision." § 13.02, subd. 11 (1988). See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text
for other definitions of terms used in the Act.
21. See Itasca County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Olson, 372 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) ("The Data Practices Act presumes public access," with exceptions.); see
alsoJohnson v. Dirkswager, 315 N.W.2d 215, 221-22 (Minn. 1982) ("Under the Data
[Vol. 16
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Practices Act is to attempt "to reconcile the rights of data subjects to
protect personal information from indiscriminate disclosure with the
right of the public to know what the government is doing. The Act
also attempts to balance those competing rights within a context of
effective government operation."22 As one commentator pointed
out, when Minnesota enacted the Data Practices Act it was the first in
the country, and was considered to be a model for other states. That
conception never became reality. Most jurisdictions have statutes
that codify public access to government data, but the Minnesota
measure is still the most comprehensive law of its kind.23
The Minnesota Data Practices Act divides all government data into
two general categories: "data on individuals,"24 and "data not on
Privacy/Practices Act, all government data is public unless classified otherwise, that
is, classified as not public, or, in the case of individuals, either private or confiden-
tial."); Minnesota Medical Ass'n v. State, 274 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Minn. 1978) ("The
legislature has provided mechanisms by which the public may be denied access to
information controlled by state agencies. It has further determined that public
records are to be available to the public 'except as otherwise expressly provided by
law.' ") (citation omitted). See generally Gemberling & Weissman, Data Privacy: Every-
thing You Wanted to Know About the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act-From "A " to
"Z", 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 573, 580 (1982) (There is a legislative presumption
that government data are public unless otherwise controlled by "a controlled state
statute or federal law classifying data more restrictively .... ).
22. Gemberling & Weissman, supra note 21, at 575; accord Padilla v. Minnesota
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 382 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Itasca
County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Olson, 372 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (citations
omitted). The purpose of the Data Practices Act is to protect an individual's privacy
while satisfying the interest of government as well as society's need for information.
These needs are protected by controlling the collection and dispersal of the informa-
tion. See also State by Johnson v. Colonna, 371 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); Minnesota Medical Ass'n v. State, 274 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 1978).
23. Tanick, Clouds Descend on the Minnesota Sunshine Laws, 58 HENNEPIN LAW.,
July-Aug. 1989, at 9, 24. The comprehensiveness of the Minnesota Data Practices
Act has caused confusion and has led to criticism of the Act. The Act has been de-
scribed as:
an imperfect mechanism to deal with an extremely complex issue which, on-
ion-like, reveals layer after layer of intricacy and subtlety the closer one ap-
proaches the problem. As a matter of public policy, the protection of
personal data privacy must compete with other legitimate social objectives,
particularly public access to data that describes governmental operations.
The balance struck will, of necessity, be delicate and ephemeral. The Min-
nesota Government Data Practices Act is a salutary effort to grapple with the
question of maintaining both informational privacy and openness in govern-
ment during the post-industrial era.
Gemberling & Weissman, supra note 21, at 598. See infra note 193 and accompanying
text for a further discussion of the problems with the Minnesota Data Practices Act.
24. The Data Practices Act defines "data on individuals" as "all government data
in which any individual is or can be identified as the subject of that data, unless the
appearance of the name or other identifying data can be clearly demonstrated to be
only incidental to the data and the data are not accessed by ... [any] identifying data
.... MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 5 (1988).
1990]
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individuals."25 These categories are then subdivided into public,26
nonpublic, 2 7 and confidential data.28 The Act provides large penal-
ties for violations.29
While the Act creates a presumption that government data is open
to the public, it also contains several exceptions. One exception is
for personnel data, which is located in section 13.43 of Minnesota's
Data Practices Act.SO Personnel data is defined in the Act as "data on
individuals collected because the individual is or was an employee of
or an applicant for employment by ... a state agency, statewide sys-
tem or political subdivision . . . ."31 Section 13.43 provides that
some general types of personnel data on public employees are public
data,32 including "the final disposition of any disciplinary action and
supporting documentation .... "33 All other personnel data not spe-
cifically listed as public data is presumed to be "private data on indi-
25. The Act defines "data not on individuals" as "all government data which is
not data on individuals." MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 4 (1988).
26. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
27. Nonpublic data is defined as "data not on individuals that is made by statute
or federal law applicable to the data: (a) not accessible to the public; and (b) accessi-
ble to the subject, if any, of the data." MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 9 (Supp. 1989).
The Act defines "private data on individuals" as "data which is made by statute or
federal law applicable to the data: (a) not public; and (b) accessible to the individual
subject of that data." MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 12 (1988).
28. The Act defines confidential data not on individuals as "protected non-public
data." MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 13 (1988). Protected nonpublic data is "data not
on individuals which is made by statute or federal law applicable to the data (a) not
public and (b) not accessible to the subject of the data." Id. The Act defines "confi-
dential data on individuals" as "data which is made not public by statute or federal
law applicable to the data and is inaccessible to the individual subject of that data."
MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 3 (1988).
29. See supra note 16.
30. MINN. STAT. § 13.43, subd. 1 (1988).
31. Id.
32. Section 13.43, subdivision 2 makes public the following personnel data on
current and former government employees':
name; actual gross salary; salary range; contract fees; actual gross pension;
the value and nature of employer paid fringe benefits; the basis for and the
amount of any added renumeration, including expense reimbursement, in
addition to salary; job title; job description; education and training back-
ground; previous work experience; date of first and last employment; the
status of any complaints or charges against the employee, whether or not the complaint or
charge resulted in a disciplinary action; and the final disposition of any disciplinary
action and supporting documentation; work location; a work telephone number;
badge number; honors and awards received; payroll time sheets or other
comparable data that are only used to account for employee's work time for
payroll purposes, except to the extent that release of time sheet data would
reveal the employee's reasons for the use of sick or other medical leave or
other not public data; and city and county of residence.




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss2/6
OPEN MEETING LAW
viduals, but may be released pursuant to a court order."34
Section 13.43 appears to be clear on its face. But, upon closer
examination, it is not clear when a "final disposition of any discipli-
nary action"35 actually occurs. Does final disposition of any discipli-
nary action occur when a public body makes its final determination
of how to discipline an employee, or does it occur when the em-
ployee has exhausted all of his or her rights to appeal the disciplinary
sanction imposed by the public body? The Minnesota Supreme
Court attempts in Annandale Advocate to answer this difficult question.
B. The Minnesota Open Meeting Law
1. An Overview of the Open Meeting Law
The Open Meeting Law, like the Data Practices Act, creates a pre-
sumption of governmental openness to the public. The Open Meet-
ing Law is located in Minnesota Statutes, section 471.705 and
provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all meetings, in-
cluding executive sessions, of any state agency, board, commission
or department when required or permitted by law to transact pub-
lic business in a meeting, and the governing body of any school district
however organized, unorganized territory, county, city, town, or other
public body, and of any committee, subcommittee, board, depart-
ment or commission thereof, shall be open to the public, except meet-
ings of the board of pardons and the commissioner of
corrections .... This section shall not, apply to any state agency,
board, or commission when exercising quasi-judicial functions in-
volving disciplinary proceedings.3 6
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that the presumption of
openness contained in section 471.705 is "to be construed most fa-
vorably to the public."37 The Open Meeting Law is liberally con-
strued because it is "enacted for the public benefit."38
In interpreting the Open Meeting Law, Minnesota courts have
34. MINN. STAT. § 13.43, subd. 4 (1988).
35. The Data Practices Act does not define what constitutes a "final disposition"
of a disciplinary proceeding.
36. MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 1 (1988) (emphasis added).
37. St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc. v. District 742 Community Schools, 332 N.W.2d
1, 4 (Minn. 1983).
38. Id. This proposition of law from St. Cloud Newspapers, 372 N.W.2d at 4, is also
cited in: Merz v. Leitch, 342 N.W.2d 141, 145 (Minn. 1984); Northwest Publications,
Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 435 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Minnesota Daily v.
University of Minn., 423 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) ("The law is to be
construed in favor of public access, with only limited exceptions."); Annandale Advo-
cate v. City of Annandale, 418 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 435
N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1989); Itasca County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Olson, 372 N.W.2d 804,
807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
For a discussion of the purposes and benefits of open meeting laws, as well as
1990]
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found three purposes: "(1) to prevent public bodies from acting
secretly without the public having an opportunity to detect improper
influences, (2) to assure the public's right to be informed, and (3) to
afford an opportunity for members of the public to present their
views."39 More simply, the purpose of the Minnesota Open Meeting
Law, as well as other open meeting laws, is to prevent the govern-
ment from operating secretly behind closed doors in order "to main-
tain the faith of the public in governmental agencies by allowing
citizen attendance and participation in all phases of the decision
making process." 40 The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated in
support of the Open Meeting Law that "''[a]lthough it might not be
empirically demonstrable, it seems intuitively certain that openness
produces better governmental programs, more efficiency in govern-
ment, and government more responsive to public interest and less
susceptible to corruption than does secrecy.' "41
other aspects, see Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes Making
Public Proceedings Open to the Public, 38 A.L.R.3d 1070 (1971 & Supp. 1989).
39. Minnesota Daily v. University of Minn., 432 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988); see also Merz v. Leitch, 342 N.W.2d 141, 145 (Minn. 1984); St. Cloud Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. District 742 Community Schools, 332 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 1983); North-
west Publications, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 435 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989);
Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale, 418 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988), rev'd, 435 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1989); Itasca County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Olson,
372 N.W.2d 804, 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
40. Comment, Open Meetings in Virginia: Fortifying the Virginia Freedom of Information
Act, 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 261, 261-62 (1974). In discussing the interests to be pro-
tected by open government laws, another commentator has stated:
Although the courts have talked about the evils of conducting the public's
business "secretly" and in the "dark" behind "closed doors," the mere ex-
clusion of the public does not necessarily imply that the public's interest is
being badly served in the decisions made. Those catchy phrases are merely
surrogates for something else. Among the more important public interests
advanced by open government laws are that: voters are enabled to evaluate
their elected officials better; information about current public issues will be
better disseminated; public participation may supply information not other-
wise available to the decision makers; public participation may supply points
of view that would otherwise be ignored; and, perhaps most importantly,
opportunities for undetected official misconduct are narrowed.
Little & Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider's View, 53 N.C.L. REV. 451, 469
(1975). Similarly, another commentator stated in support of open meeting laws that:
Confidence in government is necessary for the successful administration of
public business. Suppression of information leads to deception which, after
the truth finally comes to light through leaks or efforts of the press, contrib-
utes to a credibility gap between politicians and the people. The resulting
suspicion increases the feeling of the people that things are being hidden
from them, about which they have a right to know.... There is a symbiotic
relationship between secrecy and evil in government. Corrupt practices are
kept confidential because they are wrong, and the wrongs are made possible
through secrecy.
Comment, Open Meeting Laws: An Analysis and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151, 1161
(1974) (footnotes omitted).
41. St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc. v. District 742 Community Schools, 332 N.W.2d
[Vol. 16
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has also recognized, however, that
"[t]here is a point beyond which open discussion requirements may
serve to immobilize a body and prevent the resolution of important
problems."42 In Moberg v. Independent School District No. 281,43 the
court stated that the determination of when it is in the public's best
interest to close a governmental meeting is made by balancing "the
public's right to be informed .. .against the public's right to the
effective and efficient administration of public bodies."44
2. Exceptions to the Open Meeting Law
The legislature and the courts have provided some exceptions to
the Open Meeting Law in order to allow public bodies to close their
doors when the benefit to the body in its ability to administrate out-
weigh the public's right to be informed. The exceptions are a recog-
nition that "[t]he open meetings principle is not an absolute. The
reasons for excluding the public, however, should be substantive
public policy reasons that weigh directly against open public discus-
sion." 4 5 Commentators have argued that there are several reasons
for placing limits on the openness of governmental decision making
to the public:
[C]ertain matters, if discussed in public, allow private interests to
benefit at the public's expense (as in matters relating to the
purchase of lands); that openness will inhibit free give and take
among officials and lead to poorly thought out decisions; that dis-
putes between policy makers and administrators, if publicly aired,
will create difficult and inefficient management of programs; that
certain matters are too sensitive for public view (certain personnel matters and
matters of security); that public officials will waste time in needless
speechmaking and other egosalving activities; and, that sensational
and irresponsible reporting of news will distort the facts and unjus-
tifiably undermine confidence in public officials.
Although each of these criticisms has some credibility, none is
persuasive by itself and all of them together can justify no more
than the narrowest of exceptions at most. The arguments for open
government simply outweigh them.... The limits and exceptions
to openness must be carefully and narrowly defined.4 6
1, 5 (Minn. 1983) (quoting Little & Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider's View,
53 N.C.L. REV. 451, 475 (1975)).
42. Moberg v. Independent School Dist. No. 281, 336 N.W.2d 510, 517 (Minn.
1983).
43. 336 N.W.2d 510 (Minn. 1983).
44. Id. at 517.
45. Tacha, The Kansas Open Meeting Act: Sunshine on the Sunflower State?, 25 U. KAN.
L. REV. 169, 172 (1977).
46. Little & Tompkins, supra note 40, at 475 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis ad-
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has similarly stated that the excep-
tions to the Open Meeting Law must be limited because the legisla-
ture "clearly intended that all meetings of public agencies be open,
with rare and carefully restrained exception."4 7 Exceptions are
"rare and carefully restrained" because public "officials maybe
tempted to discuss matters beyond the legitimate scope of the pri-
vate session." 48
The potential for abuse by public officials in closed sessions has
been taken seriously by the courts. Consequently, the only judicial
exception to the Open Meeting Law at present is the attorney-client
exception.49 The attorney-client exception allows a public body to
close a meeting only when discussing litigation strategy5O with its at-
Especially in the early stages of working out a particular problem, it makes a
good deal of sense for any governmental body to retain a zone of privacy
within which its members can air internal disagreements. A position, once
publicly taken, is not easily changed; and it seems undesirable to encourage
the adoption of "first thoughts" by requiring that all collective governmen-
tal thinking be done in public.... The value competing against "a right to
know" then is not a "right to secrecy," but an assurance of some insulation
from the intense heat of public pressure. Priorities must be determined,
decisions made, and programs implemented. Absolute openness will de-
tract from the overall public interest in informed and rational governmental
decisions.
Wickham, Let the Sun Shine In!: Open-Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in
State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 480, 481-82 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
47. St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc. v. District 742 Community Schools, 332 N.W.2d
1, 5 (Minn. 1983) (emphasis in original); accord Northwest Publications, Inc. v. City of
St. Paul, 435 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); see also In re Occupational License
of Hutchinson, 440 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (both citing St. Cloud
Newspapers, Inc., 332 N.W.2d at 5); cf Itasca County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Olson, 372
N.W.2d 804, 809 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) ("The legislature has restricted the manner
in which an exception to the Open Meeting Law can be created in order to further its
important public purposes.")
48. Note, The Minnesota Open Meeting Law After Twenty Years-A Second Look, 5 WM.
MrCHELL L. REV. 375, 409 (1979).
49. The attorney-client exception to the Open Meeting Law was created by the
supreme court pursuant to its regulation of the practice of law. Minnesota Daily v.
University of Minn., 432 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); accord Itasca
County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Olson, 372 N.W.2d 804, 808 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (arti-
cle 3, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution empowers the supreme court to regu-
late practice of law).
The Minnesota Supreme Court first developed the attorney-client exception to
the Open Meeting Law in Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Housing and Rede-
velopment Auth. ex rel City of Minneapolis, 310 Minn. 313, 251 N.W.2d 620 (1976).
The court stated in Minneapolis Star that there is an attorney-client exception to the
Open Meeting Law "assuming that the public officers and attorneys do not abuse
their trust by extending the privilege as a mere conduit to suppress public observa-
tion of the decision-making process. The 'in confidence' communication must not be
arbitrarily or unreasonably exercised." Id. at 322-23, 251 N.W.2d at 625 (citation
omitted).
50. See Northwest Publications, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 435 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989). "The attorney-client exception properly applies when a governing
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torney for "threatened or pending litigation."51 The exception does
not "extend to the mere request for general legal advice or opin-
ion" 52 by a public body to its attorney.
Besides the judicially created attorney-client exception, the Open
Meeting Law itself contains several legislatively enacted exceptions.
One of these statutory exceptions applies to "any state agency,
board, or commission when exercising quasi-judicial functions in-
volving disciplinary proceedings. "53 Another exception applies to
labor negotiations when a public employer is planning its negotia-
tion strategy. 54 Finally, a statutory exception exists for certain
printed materials distributed to public officials at an open meeting.
While not per se allowing a public body to close a meeting, this
printed materials exception prevents printed materials classified as
nonpublic by the Data Practices Act from being viewed by the public
at an open meeting.55 The intended scope and meaning of this
body seeks legal advice concerning litigation strategy. The privilege is not available,
however, when a governing body seeks instead to discuss the strengths and weak-
nesses of the underlying proposed enactment which may give rise to future litiga-
tion." Id.
51. Minneapolis Star, 310 Minn. at 324, 251 N.W.2d at 626.
52. Id. See also Northwest Publications, 435 N.W.2d at 66-67 (citing Minneapolis Star,
310 Minn. at 324, 251 N.W.2d at 626) ("While attorney-client privilege exception is
operable to implement the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship, the ex-
ception will almost never extend to the mere request for general legal advice or
opinion.").
53. MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 1 (1988). Like other exceptions to the Open
Meeting Law, the quasi-judicial exception for disciplinary proceedings is narrowly
construed by the courts:
Only when the agency engages in disciplinary proceedings may meetings
involving the exercise of quasi-judicial powers be closed to the public. The
exception does not permit an agency to meet in private simply because it is
engaged in quasi-judicial activity .... [This] narrow exception . . . affords
sufficient protection of the rights involved. A disciplinary proceeding, if
conducted in public, may significantly injure the reputation of the affected
party.
Note, supra note 48, at 402-03.
54. MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. la (1988). "The governing body of a public
employer may by a majority vote in a public meeting decide to hold a closed meeting
to consider strategy for labor negotiations, including negotiation strategies or devel-
opments or discussion and review of labor negotiation proposals . I..." d.
55. Minnesota Statutes § 471.705, subdivision lb reads in pertinent part:
In any meeting which under subdivision 1 must be open to the public, at least one copy of
any printed materials relating to the agenda items of the meeting which are prepared
or distributed by or at the direction of the governing body or its employees
and which are:
(1) distributed at the meeting to all members of the governing body;
(2) distributed before the meeting to all members; or
(3) available in the meeting room to all members;
shall be available in the meeting room for inspection by the public. The materials
shall be available to the public while the governing body considers their
subject matter. This subdivision does not apply to materials classified by law as other
1990]
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printed materials exception, however, is not ascertainable from only
the literal words of the statute.56
C. The Conflict Between the Data Privacy Act and the Open Meeting Law
For the first time in Itasca County Board of Commissioners v. Olson, 57
the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the
Data Practices Act creates an exception to the Open Meeting Law
allowing a public body to close a meeting while discussing nonpublic
data. This issue was presented to the court of appeals in Olson in the
form of a declaratory action. Specifically, the court was asked to de-
termine whether the Itasca County Board of Commissioners should
close a meeting when conducting a performance evaluation of the
Itasca Memorial Hospital Administrator, Gene Hanson. Hanson ar-
gued the meeting should be closed because the evaluation would in-
volve the discussion of "private personnel data" as classified by
section 13.43, subdivision 4 of the Data Practices Act.58
The court of appeals rejected Hanson's argument holding that the
general language in section 13.43, subdivision 4 was not specific
enough to qualify as an exception under the Open Meeting Law.
The statute "merely indicates in general terms that certain personnel
data should normally be considered private. It does not expressly
provide that meetings of public bodies subject to the Open Meeting
Law should be closed to the public when personnel data classified as
private is discussed."59
The court based its decision on the fact that another section of the
Data Practices Act, section 13.03, subdivision 4, requires "[tihe clas-
sification of data ... [to] change if it is required to do so to comply
... with a specific statute applicable to the data .... "60 This requirement,
concluded the court, requires the classification of private personnel
data "to change to public when it is reasonably necessary for a public
body subject to the Open Meeting Law to discuss the data."61 The
Olson court added that only the classification of private personnel
than public as defined in chapter 13, or to materials relating to the agenda items
of a closed meeting held in accordance with the procedures in subdivision
la or other law permitting the closing of meetings.
MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. lb (1988) (emphasis added).
56. The printed materials exception in subdivision lb for materials classified as
private by the Data Practices Act was added to the Open Meeting Law in 1983 when
the statute was amended for the fourth time. Comment, What Constitutes a "Meeting"
Under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law?, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 251, 252-53 (1985)
(citing Act of May 12, 1983, ch. 137, § 1, 1983 Minn. Laws 377).
57. 372 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
58. Id. at 805. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
59. Id. at 808.
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data of "managerial or supervisory employees [is changed to public]
because their performance is of particular significance to the public,
and not data on ministerial employees."6 2 The court did not elabo-
rate on how managerial or supervisory employees are to be distin-
guished from ministerial employees.63
In cases subsequent to Olson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has
continued to require data classified as not public by the Data Prac-
tices Act to change its classification to public when it is necessary to.
discuss the data at a meeting required to be open under the Open
Meeting Law.64 This apparent subordination of the Data Practices
Act to the Open Meeting Law by the court of appeals has created
confusion for public bodies.65 In particular, the distinction made by
62. Id.
63. Id. The court of appeals stated in Olson that the classification of private per-
sonnel data on managerial or supervisory employees is changed to public when it is
necessary to discuss the data at an open meeting. The classification of the data
changes from private to public because:
The public has an obvious and important interest in obtaining a full disclo-
sure of information relevant to the job performance of its high-level public
employees. Those who accept such positions know they become public
figures and must have lower expectations of privacy regarding data relevant
to their performance. On the other hand, the privacy of ministerial employ-
ees will generally not be disturbed because of the Open Meeting Law.
Id. The court added, however, somewhat unclearly that "we cannot emphasize too
strongly that the Open Meeting Law should not be extended in application to destroy
the integrity of the Data Practices Act as it concerns all levels of public employees in
their personnel matters." Id. How the integrity of the Data Practices Act is to be
protected is far from clear when the court requires personnel data classified as pri-
vate by the Data Practices Act to be reclassified public when discussed at an open
meeting. This requirement seems to leave little to the protections afforded by the
Data Practices Act to personnel matters of public employees, i.e., the privacy protec-
tions of the Act seem to be rendered non-existent. Furthermore, the distinction be-
tween "high-level public employees" and "ministerial employees" is not clearly made
by the court.
64. See, e.g., Minnesota Daily v. University of Minn., 432 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988) ("A meeting which is required by statute to be open may not be
closed just because the Data Practices Act applies to matters which will be discussed
at the meeting."); Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale, 418 N.W.2d 522 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 435 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1989). A commentator has observed
that "[t]he Court of Appeals has generally been more hospitable to claims for access
under the Open Meeting and Data Practices statutes than has the Supreme Court. A
pattern has emerged in which the appellate court tends to uphold Sunshine claims,
... and the Supreme Court reverses." Tanick, supra note 23, at 24.
65. The League of Minnesota Cities notes in its amicus curiae brief in Annandale
Advocate that the apparent subordination of the Data Practices Act to the Open Meet-
ing Law is problematic for several reasons. This apparent subordination is problem-
atic because:
[M]unicipal governing bodies often have to discuss personnel matters relat-
ing to all levels of public employment. For example, in 801 of the 855 Min-
nesota cities all significant personnel actions must be made by the governing
body itself. Only in the 47 city manager and 4 strong mayor cities can the
city council avoid becoming involved certain personnel matters. Generally
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the Olson court between managerial or supervisory employees and
ministerial employees is unclear and confusing.66 In addition, the
reasoning has been criticized for not taking into consideration the
data privacy exception in section 471.705, subdivision lb of the
Open Meeting Law. This exception prohibits the public from view-
ing printed materials classified as not public at an open meeting.67
The questions raised by Olson and its progeny set the stage for the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Annandale Advocate v. City ofAnnandale to
attempt to resolve the conflicts between the Data Practices Act and
the Open Meeting Law. 6 8
II. FACTS OF ANNANDALE ADVOCATE V. CITY OF ANNANDALE
The facts presented in Annandale Advocate were undisputed. On
October 23, 1986, the Annandale Chief of Police, William Ledwein,
was indicted by a grand jury for reckless discharge of a handgun.69
In November of 1986, the Annandale City Council retained private
outside counsel to investigate various allegations of misconduct, in-
cluding sexual misconduct, against Ledwein. 70 On February 27,
1987, the City Council discussed the outside counsel's investigative
report prepared on Ledwein at a closed meeting.7 1 The City Council
closed the meeting under the belief that the Data Practices Act re-
quired it to do so when conducting an employee disciplinary pro-
the council as a body has responsibility to hire, fire, discipline and make all
other administrative decisions with regard to personnel, including the low-
est level city employees. Additionally, with the increased importance placed
on employee due process rights, even persons in the lowest job classifica-
tions are often entitled to a hearing before the municipal governing body.
Thus the Court of Appeals is wrong in concluding that the governing body
will only be involved with personnel decisions relating to high level
employees.
Brief for the Amicus Curiae League of Minnesota Cities at 12, Annandale Advocate v.
City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1989).
66. Brief for the Amicus Curiae League of Minnesota Cities at 13. ("If there is a
distinction between high level and low level employees for purposes of the Open
Meeting Law and the Data Practices Act, the question arises as to what factors deter-
mine whether a given employee is a managerial or supervisory employee.").
67. See Tritz, Councils Must Use Care when Disciplining or Dismissing City Employees, 73
MINN. CITIES, Apr. 1988, at 26, 28. The court of appeal's conclusion that private
personnel data is reclassified as public data when it must to be discussed "at an open
meeting is... somewhat puzzling in light of... [section 471.705, subdivision lb] of
the Open Meeting Law.... If in fact the Legislature intended for private data auto-
matically to become public when discussed at a meeting, there would seem to be no
point to this exception." Id.
68. 435 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1989).
69. Id. at 25.
70. Id. John Scherer was the attorney hired by the City Council to conduct the
investigation.
71. Id. at 25.
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ceeding.72 The City Council's discussion of the report resulted in its
passing a resolution to discharge Ledwein.73
As an honorably discharged veteran, Chief Ledwein had a right to
a hearing before the Veterans Preference Board prior to dis-
charge.74 Copies of the investigative report that the City Council
used to make its decision were not made available to the public.75
Subsequent to the city council meeting, Ledwein requested and re-
ceived a hearing date for a Veterans Preference Board review.76
Also subsequent to the city council meeting, a local newspaper re-
quested to see the investigative report.77 When the Annandale City
Council denied the request, the newspaper brought a motion to
compel the release in Wright County District Court.78 After an in
camera review, "the district court ordered that the investigative re-
port, except information which identified alleged victims of sexual
72. Id. at 25-26. For a complete discussion of the Data Practices Act see infra
notes 20-35 and accompanying text.
73. Id. at 26.
74. Id. Ledwein had a right to a hearing before the Veterans Preference Board
because of the Veterans Preference Act. The Veterans Preference Act provides:
No person holding a position by appointment or employment in the several
counties, cities, towns, school districts and all other political subdivisions in
the state, who is a veteran separated from the military service under honora-
ble conditions, shall be removed from such position or employment except for incom-
petency or misconduct shown after a hearing, upon due notice, upon stated
charges, in writing.
MINN. STAT. § 197.46 (1988) (emphasis added).
Under the Veterans Preference Act, a public employer must notify a veteran in
writing of a pending discharge and of the veteran's right to request a hearing within
60 days. If a veteran notified of this right does not request a hearing within 60 days,
the right to a hearing is waived. The failure to request a hearing waives all other
legal remedies for reinstatement. Id.
In Southern Minn. Mun. Power Agency v. Schrader, 394 N.W.2d 796 (Minn.
1986), the Minnesota Supreme Court determined the scope of power of a Veterans
Preference Act hearing board. The Veterans Preference Board has the power to
modify the employer's disciplinary sanction upon a finding of extenuating circum-
stances. Id. at 802. The hearing board has two predominant tasks when it conducts a
veterans preference hearing. These tasks of the hearing board are to determine
whether the employer has acted reasonably, and, to determine whether extenuating
circumstances justify a modification in the disciplinary sanction. Id. at 801-02.
The board is to take into consideration several factors when determining
whether an employer has acted reasonably. The factors include "the veteran's con-
duct, the effect upon the workplace and work environment, and the effect upon the
veteran's competency and fitness for the job." Id. at 802. Once the hearing is com-
pleted, the Veteran's Preference Board issues a written statement of its findings.
Both the veteran and the employer may then appeal the decision of the hearing
board in district court. Id.
75. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 26.
76. Id. Ledwein had the right to a Veterans Preference Hearing because he is an
honorably discharged veteran. The hearing was set for October of 1987.
77. Id. The Annandale Advocate was the local newspaper.
78. Id. The motion was made on July 15, 1987.
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misconduct and that protected by the city's attorney-client privilege
be released to the public."79 The district court based the order on
its determination "that the meeting at which the city council voted to
terminate Ledwein was a 'final disposition' of a disciplinary ac-
tion."80 Under Minnesota Statutes, section 13.43, subdivision 2 in-
formation from a final disposition of a disciplinary action is public.8'
Therefore, the investigative report was public data.82
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's deci-
sion.83 The court of appeals also raised an additional issue on ap-
peal not considered by the district court. This issue involved the
question of whether the Open Meeting Law required the investiga-
tive report on Ledwein to be made public. 84 The court held that
under the Open Meeting Law the council had no authority to close
the meeting where the report was discussed. Since the meeting was a
final disposition of a disciplinary action and the meeting should have
been open, the court held that the report must be made available to
the public.85
III. HOLDING OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed two main issues in An-
nandale Advocate.86 The first issue involved the question of when the
"final disposition" of a disciplinary action against a public employee
79. Id. All parties agreed to provide the court with a copy of the investigative
report for its in camera review.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
82. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 26.
83. Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale, 418 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988).
84. Id. at 524. The court of appeals raised the question for the first time at oral
argument and requested briefing on the issue. Counsel for each party then submitted
letter briefs.
85. Id. at 525.
86. The Minnesota Supreme Court also raised the issue of Ledwein's standing to
appeal the order of the lower courts to release the investigative report. Annandale
Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 26. The standing issue existed because Ledwein was not a
named party in the newspaper's action nor did he seek to intervene. The district
court allowed Ledwein to appear and argue at the hearing, although it ruled that he
lacked standing. Id. The issue of standing was not addressed by the Minnesota
Court of Appeals. It was also not appealed by any of the parties to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, but was raised by the court on its own motion. Id.
The court ruled that Ledwein did have standing to appeal the release of the
investigative report. Id. at 27. The standard for determining whether a party has
standing in Minnesota is, absent evidence of legislative intent to the contrary,
whether that party's legitimate interest is "injured in fact." Snyder's Drug Stores v.
Minnesota State Bd. of Pharmacy, 301 Minn. 28, 32, 221 N.W.2d 162, 165 (1974).
The court determined that "the release of the report would cause an 'injury in fact' to
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occurs under section 13.43, subdivision 2 of the Data Practices Act.87
The second issue involved the question of whether data classified as
private personnel data under the Data Practices Act must be reclassi-
fied as public data when discussed at an open meeting.88
With respect to the first issue, the supreme court held that the final
disposition of a disciplinary action against a public employee occurs
when the employee has exhausted all of his or her rights of appeal. 89
Even though the resolution of the City Council "to terminate
Ledwein was its final decision .... it was not a 'final disposition' of
his case because Ledwein had exercised his right.., to have a further
hearing on the matter."90 Since no final disposition of the discipli-
nary action against Ledwein had occurred, the investigative report
on him did not become public data under section 13.43 of the Data
Practices Act.9t Therefore, the report was not public data and the
supreme court reversed the order of the court of appeals compelling
release of the report.92
With respect to the second issue, the supreme court held that the
Open Meeting Law in section 471.705, subdivision lb "mandates the
closure of the portion of a public meeting in which data classified as
private by the Data Practices Act is discussed."93 The Annandale
City Council, therefore, was correct in closing its meeting when dis-
cussing the investigative report because the report was classified as
private personnel data under the Data Practices Act.94
Ledwein's legitimate interests of reputation and privacy." Annandale Advocate, 435
N.W.2d at 27.
The conclusion reached by the court on the issue of Ledwein's standing is rea-
sonable, especially in light of what the court has previously stated about the issue of
standing:
"An actor who participates, with or without formal pleading or intervention,
as an active contestant on the merits for the determination of issues of law
or fact, and who by the outcome of the proceeding will be bound and af-
fected either favorably or adversely, with respect to an asserted interest pe-
culiar to him as distinguished from an interest common to the public or
other taxpayers in general, is a party to the proceeding."
J.L. Shiely Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R., 252 Minn. 535, 541, 91
N.W.2d 116, 120 (1958) (quoting In re Acquisition of Flying Cloud Airport, State ex
rel DePonsi Aviation Co. v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metro. Airport Comm'n., 226 Minn.
272, 278, 32 N.W.2d 560, 564 (1948)).
87. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 26.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 28. A final disposition is the "final determination of the matter itself,"
and not just the final decision of a body on the matter.
90. Id. Ledwein had a right to a hearing under the Veterans Preference Act.
91. Id. at 29. "[Tlhe legislature has expressly indicated that confidential person-
nel data of government employees shall not become public until after a final disposi-
tion of the disciplinary proceeding." Id.
92. Id. at 34.
93. Id. at 33.
94. Id. In balancing the issues of private data and open meetings the court found
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In a lone dissent, Chief Justice Popovich, then Justice Popovich,
strongly argued against the majority's holding.95 In his opinion, the
majority's holding contradicts the purpose of the Open Meeting
Law, which guarantees the right of citizens to be informed of how
governmental decisions are made.96 Chief Justice Popovich would
have held both that a final disposition of a disciplinary hearing had
occurred in this situation 9 7 and that section 471.705, subdivision lb
does not require a public meeting to be closed when private data is
discu ssed.98
IV. ANALYSIS BY THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
A. Final Disposition of Disciplinary Action Under Section 13.43,
Subdivision 2
The Minnesota Supreme Court stated in Annandale Advocate that
the court of appeals mistakenly appeared to equate "final disposi-
tion" with "final decision." 9 9 The court of appeals made this mis-
taken assumption when it held that the resolution of the Annandale
City Council to discharge Ledwein constituted a final disposition of a
disciplinary action under section 13.43, subdivision 2 of the Data
Practices Act. The court based this conclusion on the definitions of
"final decision" and "final disposition" given in Black's Law Diction-
that "both public policy and legislative intent favor the exceptions of private data
from the Open Meeting Law." Id.
95. ChiefJustice Popovich's dissent is consistent with the approach of the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals to the Open Meeting Law and Data Practices Act while he was
ChiefJudge of that court. Given the court of appeals' approach to claims under these
statutes in the past, Chief Justice Popovich's current presence on the Minnesota
Supreme Court is significant. As one commentator pointed out:
New Chief Justice Popovich may lead the Supreme Court towards more
openness. The appellate court was generally favorable to claimants under
the Open Meeting and Data Practices statutes during his tenure as Chief
Justice of that tribunal. In the Annandale Advocate case, he wrote a forceful,
albeit solo, dissentrecognizing the potential far-reaching consequences of
the ruling in permitting governmental bodies to meet in secret when consid-
ering many kinds of personnel matters, "or any other decision involving pri-
vate data." He regarded the Court's elevation of "the private interest of
individuals above the public interest" to be antagonistic to the broad pur-
poses of public disclosure underlying both the Open Meeting Law and Data
Practices Act.
Tanick, supra note 23, at 25 (footnotes omitted).
96. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 34 (Popovich, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 36 (Popovich, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Popovich concluded that a
final disposition had occurred since Ledwein's resignation became effective before
the Veterans Preference Hearing was held, thus the resignation fully disposed of the
entire disciplinary proceeding. Id.
98. Id. at 34 (Popovich, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Popovich argued that the
legislature intended only to restrict distribution of private materials, not the discussion
of such materials at an open meeting. Id.
99. Id. at 28.
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ary. Black's defines a "final decision" as follows: " '[J]udgment or de-
cree which terminates action in court which renders it. One which
settles rights of parties respecting the subject-matter of the suit and
which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside.' "100 A "final
disposition," however, is defined in Black's as " '[s]uch a conclusive
determination of the subject-matter that after the award, judgment,
or decision is made nothing further remains to fix the rights and ob-
ligations of the parties, and no further controversy or litigation can
arise thereon.' "to
The court concluded from the definitions in Black's that the
phrases "final decision" and "final disposition" have separate and
different meanings. A " 'final decision' refers to a last decision of a
person or body on a matter while 'final disposition' refers to the last
and final determination of the matter itself."1o2 Consequently, since
Police Chief Ledwein had exercised his right to a hearing before the
Veterans Preference Board, the resolution of the Annandale City
Council to discharge him only constituted a final decision.l0 3 The
City Council's resolution was not the final disposition of the matter
because the Veterans Preference Board has the power under the Vet-,
erans Preference Act to review and amend any disciplinary actions
taken against public employees who are honorably discharged
veterans. 104
The supreme court stated in Annandale Advocate that its interpreta-
tion of the meaning of "final disposition" in section 13.43 is sup-
ported by the apparent intent of the legislature "to extend
substantial privacy protection to [the] personnel data" of public em-
ployees.105 The intent of the legislature was discernible "by the fact
that the legislature, while providing that all government data is pub-
lic unless specifically classified ootherwise, provided in Minn.Stat.
§ 13.43 that all personnel data on public employees is private unless
specifically listed otherwise."'o 6
In dissent, Chief Justice Popovich pointed out that under the ma-
jority's analysis the investigative report will never become public be-
cause given the majority's definition of "final disposition," no final
disposition of Ledwein's disciplinary proceeding will ever occur.'
0 7
100. Id. (quoting BtA.cK's LAW DICTIONARY 567 (5th ed. 1979)).
101. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 28 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 567
(5th ed. 1979)).
102. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 28.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 29. The newspaper asserted that such an interpretation of "final dispo-
sition" would contravene both the plain meaning and purpose of the statute, and
particularly so in the case of higher ranking officials. Id. at 28.
106. Id. at 29.
107. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 36 (Popovich,J., dissenting). No final dis-
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Chief Justice Popovich stated that a result like this indicates that the
majority's interpretation of the words "final disposition" in the stat-
ute is "unreasonable."108 This interpretation is unreasonable be-
cause "the fact that Ledwein's resignation was submitted and
accepted before the Veteran's Preference Hearing was held should
be seen as a final disposition of the entire disciplinary proceeding,
since there will be no Veteran's Preference Hearing."109
Moreover, Chief Justice Popovich stated that Ledwein's resigna-
tion necessarily qualifies as a final disposition, as defined by the ma-
jority, because it is " 'a conclusive determination of the subject-
matter' where 'nothing further remains to fix the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties . .' "110 The conclusion that Ledwein's resig-
nation constituted a final disposition of the matter is further
supported by the fact that "[a] settlement would not qualify as a 'final
decision' under the majority's definition, which requires that such a
decision be evidenced by a 'judgment or decree' from a court.""'l
The problem with this conclusion of Chief Justice Popovich, how-
ever, is that it assumes that a settlement is either a "final disposition"
or a "final decision" as defined by the Data Practices Act. This is not
necessarily the case.
The majority stated that while Chief Justice Popovich's point may
be true that the report on Ledwein will never become public under
its decision, "the legislature has expressly indicated that confidential
personnel data of government employees shall not become public
until after a final disposition of the disciplinary proceeding."" 12
B. The Conflict Between the Data Practices Act and the Open Meeting Law
With respect to the Open Meeting Law, the supreme court in An-
nandale Advocate first examined the exception in section 471.705, sub-
position will ever occur because Ledwein resigned before his scheduled hearing with
the Veterans Preference Board occurred in exchange for the City Council's with-
drawal of the resolution to discharge him.
108. Id. (Popovich, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Popovich, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Popovich, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (Popovich, J., dissenting).
112.- Id. at 29. In addition, the majority stated that there is a benefit to the public
in not having the report released. This benefit arises out of the fact that:
The public has a strong interest in settlement of employee discipline matters
because it permits governing bodies to discharge troublesome employees
with a minimum of cost and aggravation. At the same time, it allows em-
ployees the opportunity to avoid adverse publicity. Release of confidential
personnel data after such a settlement, but before a final disposition of the
disciplinary matter, would remove much of the incentive for employees to
settle.... Clearly, the public's interest is better served by encouraging set-
tlements while, at the same time, expecting governing bodies to make re-
sponsible and intelligent decisions.
Id. at 29 n.2.
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division 1 for " 'any state agency, board, or commission when
exercising quasi-judicial functions involving disciplinary proceed-
ings.' "113 The court concluded from this examination that the
quasi-judicial exception does not apply to a city council or any other
type of local government.1 4 The language in section 471.705, sub-
division 1 creating a presumption of openness for governmental
meetings specifically refers to governing bodies of school districts,
unorganized territories, counties, cities, towns, or other public bod-
ies while the quasi-judicial exception in the same section refers only
"to any state agency, board, or commission."l15 The court stated
that the difference in language between these two parts of section
471.705, subdivision 1 "demonstrates that the legislature knew how
to incorporate specific reference to cities and other local government
bodies in the Open Meeting Law. It also demonstrates that, if the
legislature had wanted to exempt city governments from the Open
Meeting Law, it would have so indicated."'116 Moreover, the court
pointed out that the legislative history of subdivision 1 reveals that
the legislature specifically excluded local governments from the
quasi-judicial exception for disciplinary proceedings." 17 Therefore,
the supreme court held that the quasi-judicial exception could not
have been used by the Annandale City Council as support for its de-
cision to close the meeting in which the resolution to discharge Po-
lice Chief Ledwein was passed.l 1
Since the quasi-judicial exception did not provide support for the
City Council's decision to close the meeting, the supreme court next
examined the question of what a public body should do when infor-
mation classified as private under the Data Practices Act is discussed
at a meeting which under the Open Meeting Law is required to be
113. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 29 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd.
1 (1986)).
114. Id. at 30. Ledwein contended that the exception should apply to city council
meetings, asserting that "governing bodies other than state agencies, boards or com-
missions have traditionally closed meetings at which disciplinary actions were taken."
Id.
115. Id. at 29.
116. Id. at 30.
117. Id. The court stated that "[liegislative proceedings reveal that the phrase 'or
other governing bodies' and similar language was considered in order to include local
governments within the exception to the Open Meeting Law contained in section
471.705, subdivision 1." Id. (quoting Hearings on House File No. 2037 Before Senate as
Committee of the Whole, Minn. Legis., (May 2, 1973) (audiotape) (emphasis added)).
The phrase "or other governing bodies" was not included in the bill as finally passed.
Id. Hence, the court concluded that the absence of this phrase indicated the legisla-
tive intent was for the quasi-judicial function exception to apply only to state agen-
cies, boards and commissions. Id.
118. The court concluded that the intent of the legislature was to have one rule
for state agencies, boards and commissions and another for local governments. An-
nandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 30.
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open." 19 The court stated that the Minnesota Court of Appeals pre-
viously answered this question in Itasca County Board of Commissioners
v. Olson 120 by requiring data classified as private to be reclassified as
public when discussed at a meeting required to be open.12 1 Yet, the
supreme court pointed out that the court of appeals in Olson did not
take into consideration the exception in section 471.705, subdivision
lb for printed materials when answering this question.122
Section 471.705, subdivision lb requires that when members of a
governing body have any printed materials available to them before
or during a meeting required to be open to the public, "at least one
copy of any printed materials relating to the agenda items of the
meeting... shall be available in the meeting room for inspection by
the public."12 3 Section 471.705, subdivision lb also states, however,
that materials classified as something other than public as defined in
chapter 13 are not affected. 124 The meaning of the Data Practices Act
exception in section 471.705, subdivision lb, is not clear and the
supreme court stated there are two equally plausible interpreta-
tions.' 25 Section 471.705, subdivision lb can be interpreted either
as only prohibiting "the dissemination of written materials including
private data and not the oral discussion of such data," or as creating
"an exception to the Open Meeting Law anytime it is necessary for a
governing body to discuss non-public or private data."1 26 The court
chose the latter interpretation after examining the legislative history
of subdivision lb.127
The court's examination of the legislative history of subdivision lb
focused on statements made by the author of the bill which eventu-
ally became section 471.705, subdivision lb.128 Specifically, the
court focused on a statement made by the author on the Senate floor
in response to a question concerning whether the bill "sufficiently
protect[ed] delicate and embarrassing personnel information of gov-
ernment employees"129 from being disclosed to the public at an
open meeting. The author of the bill responded by stating:
119. Id.
120. 372 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
121. See id. at 809-10. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
122. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 31.
123. MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. lb (1988). See supra note 55 and accompanying
text.
124. MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. lb (1988).
125. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 31.
126. Id.
127. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
128. The author of the bill was Senator Donna C. Peterson. Annandale Advocate,
435 N.W.2d at 31. The court first notes that the legislative history "provides little
guidance" to interpreting this subdivision of the statute. Id. But see infra note 139.
129. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 31.
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"[T]hat's exactly why this language is in here, so that currently any
materials that are classified as not open to the public would remain
that way, and even though that material may be discussed at the
meeting, that material could not be made available to the public.
And that's why that language is in here; it's to clarify that. So any-
thing that is not open to the public now would remain that
way."lS0
The court in Annandale Advocate interpreted this statement as expres-
sing "both the intent that private data be discussed at public meet-
ings and that private data remain unavailable to the public."13, To
put it differently, the court found the author's statement to be con-
tradictory because if private data is discussed at a public meeting it
will certainly be made available to the public. Therefore, the court
concluded that the statement was inconclusive in revealing legislative
intent.132 Nevertheless, the court stated that since the author of the
bill asserted "no less than three times that information classified as
private should remain private,"13s then the primary concern of the
legislature must have been "to prevent data classified as private from
being released to the public, which would support interpreting sec-
tion 471.705, subdivision lb as an exception to the Open Meeting
Law . . . . "134
In dissent, ChiefJustice Popovich disagreed with the majority's in-
terpretation of the legislative history of subdivision lb. Relying on
the same contradictory statement of the author of the bill as well as
one other statement,' 3 5 Chief Justice Popovich stated:
[T]he legislative history . . . of subdivision lb clearly indicates it
was not the legislature's intent to close a public meeting when pri-
vate data was being discussed. The restrictions implemented by
the legislature applied only to the distribution of the material, not
130. Id. (quoting Hearings on Senate File No. 482, Minn. Legis., (Apr. 27, 1983)
(audiotape) (Statements of Sen. Donna C. Peterson during Special Orders of the
Senate).
131. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 31.
132. Id. The court noted that the contradictory statement "appears to be ambigu-
ous and inconclusive," and then went on to draw a conclusion from the statement.
Id.
133. Id. at 31-32.
134. Id. at 32.
135. In addition to the statement of the bill's author referred to by the majority,
ChiefJustice Popovich's dissent refers to another of the bill author's statements. Sen-
ator Donna Peterson states that the idea of the bill is simply that whatever materials
are printed which relate to agenda items of governing bodies and are distributed to
all the members of the body, those materials should then be available at the public
meeting. Id. at 34 (Popovich, J., dissenting) (quoting Hearings on Senate File No. 482,
Minn. Legis., (Apr. 27, 1983) (audiotape) (Statements of Sen. Donna C. Peterson
during Special Orders of the Senate).
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the discussion of the material at an open public meeting."1 3 6
In addition, he pointed out that "[tihe title of the 1983 statute enact-
ing subdivision lb . . . does not indicate the law provides authority
for any governmental body to close a public meeting. Its application
is limited to procedures relating only to the distribution of
materials." 137
The majority in Annandale Advocate stated that its conclusion that
section 471.705, subdivision lb creates an exception to the Open
Meeting Law by allowing meetings to be closed when private data is
discussed is supported by two important considerations.138 First, the
conclusion is supported by the rule of statutory construction "that
the legislature 'does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of
execution, or unreasonable.' "139 The court stated that "the protec-
tions given by the Data Practices Act become illusory" if section
471.705, subdivision lb allows oral discussion of private data while
at the same time prohibiting its dissemination in printed form.140
Second, the conclusion that section 471.705, subdivision lb creates
an exception to the Open Meeting Law is supported by the fact that,
even though openness in government is an important public policy
upon which both the Data Practices Act and the Open Meeting Law
are founded, the provision of exceptions in each statute indicates
"that, in certain situations, an equally important public policy is
served by denying public access."' 14 ' In this case, therefore, the pub-
lic policy of protecting private personnel data from disclosure out-
weighs the benefits of public access to that information.142
136. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 34 (Popovich, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
137. Id. at 35 (Popovich, J., dissenting). The title of the 1983 statute enacting
subdivision lb reads: " 'An act relating to open meetings; requiring availability of
certain materials; prescribing penalties; amending Minnesota Statutes 1982, section
471.705, by adding a subdivision.'" Id. (Popovich, J., dissenting) (quoting Act of
May 12, 1983, ch. 137, § 1, 1983 Minn. Laws 377, codified later as MINN. STAT. ch.
137 (1988)).
138. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 32.
139. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.17, subd. 1 (1986)). Justice Popovich also
employed this rule of statutory construction in his analysis.
140. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 32.
141. Id. The court cited as support for this proposition State by Johnson v.
Colonna, 371 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) holding that disclosure of
private data could be compelled "because of strong public policy supporting both
the limited and protected disclosure of private data under the Government Practices
Act," which in turn cited Minnesota Medical Ass'n v. State, 274 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn.
1978) (purpose of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act "is to control the
state's collection, security, and dissemination of information in order 'to protect the
privacy of individuals while meeting the legitimate needs of government and society
for information.'") (quoting MINN. STAT. § 15.169, subd. 3(3) (1978) (repealed
1979)).
142. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 33.
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Thus, an examination of the two considerations discussed above
supports the conclusion that section 471.705, subdivision lb creates
an exception to the Open Meeting Law when nonpublic or private
data is discussed. 143 The court stated, however, that this exception
is a narrow one allowing public bodies to close "only those portions
of... [a] meeting in which private data need be discussed."'44
In dissent, Chief Justice Popovich argued against the exception
found by the majority stating that "[t]he potential for abuse is too
great for this [the majority's] interpretation to be adopted."145 Chief
Justice Popovich reasoned that the discussion of private material that
is not distributed at an open meeting is not absurd because
"[d]iscussion ... need not reveal private information."146 For exam-
ple, in this case, the Annandale City Council in their discussion of
Ledwein's termination would not have to "refer to specific instances
of misconduct contained in the report."47 While this approach for
conducting a meeting involving the discussion of private data sug-
gested by ChiefJustice Popovich would appear to prevent the disclo-
sure of the data, it is questionable how valuable the discussion would
be in helping the decision makers to reach a rational and reasoned
decision.
Chief Justice Popovich also argued that, in this case, the benefit of
public access outweighed the benefit of protecting the private per-
sonnel data involved from public disclosure. He stated:
As the chief of police for the City of Annandale, Ledwein was the
primary law enforcement officer for the city and entrusted with
enormous power under the law. With this position comes the re-
sponsibility to uphold the public trust .... The allegations of mis-
conduct in this case are serious ones, including possible acts of
sexual misconduct against certain female persons. The public has a
right to know on what basis the city council has made its decision to
terminate and a right to witness the proceedings.148
Consequently, because "misconduct may have occurred," Chief Jus-
tice Popovich reasoned that an open public meeting is required.149
However, if the meeting is conducted in the manner suggested above
by Chief Justice Popovich, i.e., with the members of the Annandale
City Council discussing Ledwein's termination without referring to
specific instances of misconduct contained in the investigative re-
port, the public will certainly be able to witness the proceedings to
143. Id. at 32.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (Popovich, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Popovich, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 35-36 (Popovich, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 36 (Popovich, J., dissenting).
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terminate Ledwein; but, how will the public know on what basis the
City Council made its decision when nothing specific is discussed?
The majority rejects Chief Justice Popovich's argument that al-
lowing public bodies to close portions of meetings when nonpublic
data is discussed is impractical because there is much potential for
public officials to abuse this right by also discussing public data.150
The majority points out that "[b]ecause the legislature has accorded
private or non-public status to very few types of data, there is little
danger of the doors of government being slammed shut."151
V. ANALYSIS OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The conclusions reached by the Minnesota Supreme Court in An-
nandale Advocate appear to be fair and correct, though the court's
analysis is not completely convincing. Most of the analytical
problems, however, are the result of some vague and ambiguous
provisions contained in both the Data Practices Act and the Open
Meeting Law.
A. Final Disposition of Disciplinary Action Under Section 13.43,
Subdivision 2
The Annandale Advocate court's holding that "the final disposition
of any disciplinary action" under section 13.43, subdivision 2 of the
Minnesota Statutes "refers to the last and final determination of the
matter itself"152 is well supported. The United States Supreme
Court has stated that a final disposition "of a suit is the end of litiga-
tion therein .... [T]his cannot be said to have arrived as long as an
appeal is pending."'53 Similarly, other courts have stated that a final
disposition of a matter "means either acquittal or ultimate disposi-
tion upon remand,"'54 or" 'the final settling of the rights of the par-
ties to the action beyond all appeal.' "155 When these definitions of
final disposition are applied to the fact situation in Annandale Advo-
cate, the inevitable conclusion is that once Police Chief Ledwein exer-
cised his right of appeal to the Veterans Preference Board, the
resolution of the City Council to discharge him was not a final set-
tling of his rights beyond all appeal. Furthermore, this conclusion is
not limited to the specific fact situation; several state and federal laws
give public employees the right to challenge and appeal adverse per-
150. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 33.
151. Id. at 33.
152. Id. at 29.
153. Exparte Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 664, 669 (1871).
154. Florida Bar v. Craig, 238 So. 2d 78, 80 (Fla. 1970) (case involved discipline of
a lawyer convicted of a felony).
155. Quarture v. Allegheny County, 141 Pa. Super. 356, 362, 14 A.2d 575, 578
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1940) (citation omitted).
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sonnel decisions, including the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
Nonetheless, in this case, there had not been a final disposition of
the dispute when Ledwein exercised his right of appeal. The Veter-
ans Preference Act gives the Veterans Preference Board substantial
power to modify disciplinary sanctions imposed on an honorably dis-
charged veteran by a public employer.156 The Minnesota Supreme
Court has previously stated that nothing " 'in section 197.46 con-
template[s] that the Veteran's Preference Hearing Board serve
merely as a body that reviews findings and approves or disapproves
recommendations, but that its function is also to decide for itself
what penalty, if any, is justified.' "157 However, the Act does not give
the hearing board total discretionary power to modify decisions
made by public employers. The Act allows the hearing board to de-
termine whether the employer acted reasonably and if so, whether
extenuating circumstances justify a modification in the disciplinary
sanction imposed by the employer.158
Construing both the Data Practices Act and the Veterans Prefer-
ence Act together, the necessary conclusion is that final disposition
of the disciplinary action under section 13.43, subdivision 2 had not
occurred when Ledwein exercised his right to appeal to the Veterans
Preference Board. This conclusion is necessary given the substantial
power of the Veterans Preference Board to alter the decision made
by the City Council.15 9 Besides if the legislature had intended a final
disposition under section 13.43, subdivision 2 to mean the final deci-
sion of a public body, it would, or should, have clearly indicated this
unusual definition in the Data Practices Act.l60 The legislature cre-
156. MINN. STAT. § 197.46 (1988). See, e.g., Mitlyngv. Wolff, 342 N.W.2d 120, 123
(Minn. 1984). "The Veterans Preference Act is just what its title indicates: a law
giving preference to veterans. It says a veteran cannot be removed-i.e., dis-
charged-from his or her public employment except for incompetency or misconduct
'after a hearing.' The hearing must come first, then the discharge." Id. See supra note
74 and accompanying text.
157. Southern Minn. Mun. Power Agency v. Schrader, 394 N.W.2d 796, 801
(Minn. 1986).
158. Id. at 802 ("The Veterans Preference Act, enacted to control the unfettered
discretion of public employers toward veterans, did not intend to place total discre-
tionary power in the veterans preference hearing board."). See supra note 74.
159. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
160. Subsequent to the Minnesota Supreme Court's determination of Annandale
Advocate onJanuary 20, 1989, Representative Carruthers introduced a bill in the Min-
nesota House of Representatives to clarify the meaning of "final disposition" in sec-
tion 13.43. See H.R. 1365, 76th Leg., 1989 Minn. Laws. The language proposed in
this bill to clarify the meaning of final disposition stated the following: "For purposes
of this subdivision, a final disposition occurs when the state agency, statewide system,
or political subdivision makes its final decision about the disciplinary action, regard-
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ated a presumption in section 13.43, subdivision 4 that personnel
data on public employees is private unless specifically classified
otherwise. This statutory presumption supports the inference that
the legislature intended, as the supreme court points out in Annan-
dale Advocate, to give substantial privacy protection to public employ-
ees-protection which extends until the final disposition of a
disciplinary proceeding.
Chief Justice Popovich stated in his dissent in Annandale Advocate
"that through his resignation Ledwein withdrew his request for a
Veteran's Preference Hearing and [therefore,] the disciplinary pro-
ceedings became final" requiring the investigative report to be re-
leased to the public.161 While this proposition is logically correct,
the analysis goes beyond the question appealed to the court. The
question was limited to whether the lower courts had correctly held
"that the meeting at which the city council voted to terminate
Ledwein was a 'final disposition' of a disciplinary action under" sec-
tion 13.43, subdivision 2 when Ledwein exercised his right to re-
quest a hearing under the Veteran's Preference Act.162 The fact that
Ledwein later withdrew his request for a hearing is of little impor-
tance when answering this question. This is especially true since
Ledwein's decision may have been largely prompted by the order of
the district court to release the report. Once the district court made
this ruling, Ledwein's only options were either to attempt some type
of settlement with the City or to appeal the decision of the court.' 63
But more importantly, under either option the Veterans Prefer-
ence Board had no power to change the court's order to release the
report. Consequently, it would be inequitable to punish Ledwein for
deciding to settle with the City and not proceed with his hearing
before the Veterans Preference Board, a hearing which could not
change the court's order to release the report. Also, it would be es-
pecially unfair to punish Ledwein in this way when the Minnesota
Supreme Court has previously stated that "[slettlement of disputes
less of any later proceedings, including appeals to boards, commissions, courts, or
other bodies, other legal actions, and arbitration and grievance proceedings." Id.
The bill remained in the House Governmental Operations Committee when the 1989
legislative session ended, and the House had another chance to act on it when it
reconvened in February 1990.
161. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 36 (Popovich, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 26.
163. The district court ordered the report to be released after concluding that the
City Council's resolution to discharge Ledwein constituted a final disposition of a
disciplinary proceeding. Brief of Appellant at 2, Annandale Advocate v. City of An-
nandale, 435 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1989) (No. CX-87-1583). The district court ordered
the release of the investigative report on July 30, 1987. Ledwein filed notice of ap-
peal with the Minnesota Court of Appeals on August 11, 1987, but settled with the
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without litigation is highly favored ... *," 164
ChiefJustice Popovich counters in dissent that the encouragement
of settlements is not a valid justification for the majority's interpreta-
tion of a final disposition in section 13.43, subdivision 2. He stated
that the majority's
reasoning clearly places the private interest of individuals (avoiding
embarrassing information) above the public interest (the right to
know what is going on about public officials and why). This contra-
dicts the legislature's intent to favor the public interest as against
any private interest .... While government bodies may want to
avoid litigation or expense to cover up bad hiring decisions or in-
adequate management, that by itself does not overcome the pre-
sumption in favor of the public's right to be informed of the
operation of its government. Not only do the citizens . . . suffer
from this secrecy, but other individuals may be hurt as well.165
While there is much validity in this forceful statement, Chief Justice
Popovich fails to take into consideration the other factors involved in
this type of situation. Other factors that need to be balanced against
the interest of the public in an open government include the private
interests of the persons involved, the possible chilling effect on the
free give and take of ideas between officials which is necessary to
reach well thought-out decisions, and the protections afforded the
persons involved by other laws.166 When all of these factors are
taken into consideration, the decision of the majority that no final
disposition of the disciplinary proceeding involved in this situation
had occurred is well supported.
B. Conflict Between Data Practices Act and Open Meeting Law-
Discussion of Private Data at an Open Meeting
In Annandale Advocate, the Minnesota Supreme Court began its ex-
amination of the exceptions to the Open Meeting Law by first analyz-
ing the quasi-judicial exception for disciplinary proceedings in
section 471.705, subdivision 1.167 The court concluded from its
analysis of this section that the quasi-judicial exception does not ap-
ply to local governments. This conclusion is well supported by both
the specific language used in section 471.705, subdivision 1 and the
legislative history of that provision. While the portion of the statute
creating a presumption of openness in government meetings specifi-
cally refers to cities and other forms of local government, the portion
164. Johnson v. Saint Paul Ins. Cos., 305 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Minn. 1981) (citations
omitted). See supra note 112.
165. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 37 (Popovich, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
166. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
167. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 30.
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creating an exception for quasi-judicial disciplinary proceedings re-
fers only to state agencies, boards, or commissions.168 The lack of
reference to local government in the portion of the statute creating
the exception, after specific referral to several forms of local govern-
ment in the portion creating a presumption of openness, strongly
indicates that the legislature intended the quasi-judicial exception
for disciplinary proceedings to apply only to state government. Fur-
thermore, the legislative history of the bill which became the quasi-
judicial exception also reveals the same legislative intent. The legis-
lative history of the bill discloses that language originally included in
the bill to make the quasi-judicial exception apply to local govern-
ments was omitted "[i]n the final version of the bill as passed
.... "169 The court's conclusion then, that the quasi-judicial excep-
tion for disciplinary proceedings in section 471.705, subdivision 1 of
the Open Meeting Law does not apply to local government bodies, is
well supported and beyond reproach.
The court's analysis of the data privacy exception in section
471.705, subdivision lb of the Open Meeting Law, however, is not
beyond reproach. The conclusion reached by the court in its analysis
of subdivision lb appears to be correct, but the analysis it followed
to reach this conclusion is problematic. The court found an excep-
tion in subdivision lb allowing public bodies to close meetings when
discussing nonpublic or private data in a subdivision that is primarily
concerned with the distribution of printed materials at public meet-
ings. While subdivision lb does contain an exception prohibiting
the public from viewing printed materials classified as nonpublic by
the Data Practices Act at an open meeting, it does not specifically
state that meetings must be closed when nonpublic data is discussed,
even though that would be a logical conclusion. As the court
pointed out in Annandale Advocate, the exact meaning of section
471.705, subdivision lb is unclear, and it can plausibly be inter-
preted in two different ways.' 70
Notwithstanding the contradictory legislative history of the bill
which became section 471.705, subdivision lb, the supreme court in
Annandale Advocate found support in subdivision lb for a data privacy
exception to the Open Meeting Law by relying on the contradictory
statements of the bill's author.' 7 ' While there is precedent in Min-
nesota for giving "some weight" to statements made by the author of
168. See MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 1 (1988).
169. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 30. See Hearings on House File No. 2037
Before Senate as Committee of the Whole, Minn. Legis. (May 2, 1973) (audiotape).
170. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 31. See supra note 126 and accompanying
text.
171. See supra notes 127-133 and accompanying text.
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a bill,172 it was incorrect for the court to do so here when the au-
thor's statements were clearly contradictory. The court's selective
use of the portions of the Senator's statement which lend support to
its conclusion, while ignoring the portions which refute it, results in
an extremely unconvincing and confusing analysis. By selectively us-
ing statements, the court falls into a trap which it has previously
warned others to avoid: The "[slelective use of statements made in
the give-and-take of the legislative process is ... risky. 'It sometimes
seems that citing legislative history is still ... akin to "'looking over
a crowd and picking out your friends."' "173
Rather than rely solely on legislative history, the court in Annandale
Advocate also argued that a presumptive rule of statutory construction
supports the conclusion that the Data Practices Act creates an excep-
tion to the Open Meeting Law. Under this rule of statutory construc-
tion, there is a presumption that absurd results are not intended by
the legislature.t74 The court applied this rule of construction to the
Open Meeting Law and concluded that "forbidding dissemination of
written materials regarding private data, but allowing oral discussion
of the same data would be unreasonable and perhaps absurd."175
Although this conclusion is quite reasonable, it is not entirely con-
vincing when the first line of section 471.705, subdivision lb is
considered.
As indicated earlier, the first line of that subdivision requires that
printed materials relating to the agenda of the meeting be available
for inspection by the public.176 This clearly indicates that the pur-
pose of the subdivision is to require that printed materials relating to
the agenda items of open meetings be made available for inspection by
172. The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously stated:
The legislature's intent, while deemed singular, arises from, although it is
not necessarily the same as, the collective understandings of the individual
members. Nor are member's understandings always expressed, or, if ex-
pressed, always made for the record. Consequently, statements made in
pommittee discussion or floor debate are to be treated with caution. State-
ments made, however, by the sponsor of a bill or an amendment on the purpose or effect of
the legislation are generally entitled to some weight.
Handle With Care, Inc. v. Department of Human Servs., 406 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn.
1987) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 522 n.8.(quoting Judge Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the
Use of Legislative History in the 1981-82 Supreme Court Term 25 (uly 27, 1982)
(remarks delivered at 1983 Eighth Circuit Conference)).
174. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 32 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.17, subd. 1
(1986)). See Tuma v. Commissioner of Economic Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706-07
(Minn. 1986) (construing MINN. STAT. § 268.03 (1984) so as to preserve the "general
intent of the underlying law"). See generally Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83
N.W.2d 800 (1957) (construing several Minnesota statutes regarding encumbrances
on titles).
175. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 32.
176. MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. lb (1988).
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the public. Although, subdivision lb also provides that "[tihis subdi-
vision does not apply to materials classified by law as other than pub-
lic as defined in chapter 13, or to materials relating to the agenda
items of a closed meeting,"177 this exception must be read in relation
to the first line which requires printed materials to be made available
for inspection by the public at open meetings. When read as a
whole, subdivision lb appears only to require that printed materials
classified as nonpublic by the Data Practices Act not be made available
for inspection by the public-not that discussion of nonpublic data re-
quires a meeting to be closed.
Nevertheless, even though the legislative history and statutory
construction in Annandale Advocate does not convincingly support its
conclusion that section 471.705, subdivision lb creates a data pri-
vacy exception to the Open Meeting Law, the conclusion remains
correct. The court points out, while "in both the Open Meeting Law
and the Data Practices Act, the legislature has indicated that open-
ness in government is an important public policy. . . , by providing
exceptions to each statute, [the legislature] has [also] indicated that,
in certain situations, an equally important public policy is served by
denying public access."' 7 8 One of the situations in which a public
policy other then openness in government is better served by deny-
ing public access exists for personnel data on public employees.
As the court stated, the Data Practices Act indicates a legislative
"intent to give the personnel data of public employees substantial
privacy protections."1 79 Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret sec-
tion 471.705, subdivision lb as creating an exception to the Open
Meeting Law when private personnel data is discussed, even though
the section only specifically refers to the inspection and not the dis-
cussion of nonpublic data. Commentators have pointed out that
"one of the most widely recognized exceptions" to open meeting
laws is for "personnel matters such as the hiring and firing of public
officials."180 The justifications for personnel decisions being ex-
177. Id.
178. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 32.
179. Id. See MINN. STAT. § 13.43, subd. 4 (1988).
180. See Comment, supra note 40, at 267 ("[C]ourts have had little difficulty in
accepting the validity of [a personnel] exception since it may prevent unjustified
harm to an individual's reputation. Furthermore, this exception is necessary if per-
sons of high caliber are to apply for governmental positions.") (footnote omitted); see
also Tacha, supra note 45, at 195 (A "subject matter often listed as appropriate for
discussion in... [closed meetings] is the hiring, firing, compensation, and discipline
of public employees.... The fact that an employee is paid by tax monies should not
subject that employee to the possibility that his or her job performance will be evalu-
ated in public.") (footnote omitted); Wickham, supra note 46, at 485 ("Perhaps the
most common exception pattern is the exclusion of proceedings related to personnel
management .... [T]he main motivation behind these exclusions appears to be a
feeling that government will operate far more efficiently if it is permitted to organize
[Vol. 16
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cepted from the scope of open meeting laws are as follows:
Public business is of concern to the entire electorate, but where the
proceedings at a public meeting focus on an individual, his per-
sonal privacy should be preserved. Even though a public employee
is supported by the taxpayers, he, like a non-public employee,
should not have to fear that his personal shortcomings might be
discussed in a public meeting. Discussions at public meetings are
nonjudicial in nature; therefore, the weapons of cross-examination
and confrontation for combating the possibility of irreparable harm
are not available .... Discussions of personnel matters in closed
meetings also benefit public bodies themselves. It is believed that
the governmental processes will function much more smoothly if
staffing and organizing can be done in private. In addition, it is
likely that more qualified individuals will be desirous of participat-
ing in government service if their privacy is assured. With respect
to those already on the public payroll, the assurance of privacy is
necessary in order to maintain high morale among government
employees. 181
While not all courts have accepted the discussion of personnel mat-
ters as a valid exception to open meeting laws,182 several states have
enacted this exception into their statutes.183 Accordingly, the Min-
"nesota Supreme Court's conclusion in Annandale Advocate that there is
and staff itself in private.") (footnote omitted); Note, Freedom of Information-Texas
Open Meetings Act Has Potentially Broad Coverage but Suffers from Inadequate Enforcement
Provisions. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17 (1970), 49 TEx. L. REV. 764, 771
(1971) ("[T]he appointment, employment, or dismissal of a public officer or em-
ployee ... [exception to the open meeting law] is designed to prevent unjustified
harm to the individual and to preserve employee morale generally.") (footnote omit-
ted); Comment, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know", 75 HARv.
L. REV. 1199, 1208 (1962) ("Most commonly listed [as an exception to open meeting
laws] is the appointment or discharge of, or the investigation of charges against, gov-
ernmental employees.... When possible disciplinary action or dismissal is being
considered, premature publicity can cause great and often unjustified damage to per-
sonal reputations.") (footnote omitted).
181. Comment, Open Meeting Laws: An Analysis and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151,
1173-74 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
182. E.g., Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1969). "The public has chosen to deny any privilege or discretion in... gov-
ernmental bodies to conduct closed meetings." Id. Therefore, there is no exception
for the discussion of personnel matters.
183. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11126(a) (West Supp. 1990) ("Nothing in this
article shall be construed to prevent a state body from holding closed sessions ... to
consider the appointment, employment, or dismissal of a public employee... unless
the employee requests a public hearing."); HAW. REV. STAT. § 92-5(a)(2) (1985) ("[A]
board may hold a meeting closed to the public ... [t]o consider the hire, evaluation,
dismissal, or discipline of an officer or employee or of charges brought against the
officer or employee, where consideration of matters affecting privacy will be involved
...."); 3 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.810 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986) (There is an
exception to open meetings for "[d]iscussions or hearings which might lead to the
appointment, discipline or dismissal of an individual employe, [sic] ... provided that
1990].
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a personnel data exception to the Open Meeting Law is not unique
or far-fetched. Rather, it is consistent with the majority of other state
courts and statutes, and also with the arguments of the majority of
legal commentators.
The supreme court's interpretation of section 471.705, subdivi-
sion lb as creating an exception to the Open Meeting Law when pri-
vate personnel data is discussed is also reasonable because the oral
discussion of that type of data in printed form at an open meeting
makes the data just as available to the public as when open to visual
inspection. It would be absurd to interpret subdivision lb as making
a distinction between the protections given nonpublic data based on
whether the data is visually or orally made available to the public.
Since both the visual inspection and oral discussion of private per-
sonnel data make it equally available to the public, it is logical to
interpret subdivision lb as containing a data privacy exception to the
Open Meeting Law. This data privacy exception allows meetings to
be closed when nonpublic data is discussed for the same reason it
prohibits printed materials containing nonpublic data from being in-
spected by the public at meetings-the legislature has declared that
certain types of data are not public.
This interpretation of section 471.705, subdivision lb is further
supported by concepts of balancing under both the Open Meeting
Law and the Data Practices Act previously enunciated by the courts
in Minnesota. In Moberg v. Independent School District No. 281,184 the
Minnesota Supreme Court stated that under the Open Meeting Law
"the public's right to be informed must be balanced against the pub-
lic's right to the effective and efficient administration of public bod-
ies."185 Likewise, with respect to the Data Practices Act, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals has stated that "the public's right to
know [must be balanced] with an individual's right to privacy."186
this exception is designed to protect the reputation of individual persons and shall
not be interpreted to permit discussion of general personnel matters in secret.").
184. 336 N.W.2d 510 (Minn. 1983).
185. Id. at 517. See also Northwest Publications, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 435
N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ("[Al showing by the governing body that the
need for confidentiality outweighs the public's right of access is a reasonable protec-
tion of the public interest."). See generally Note, supra note 48, at 410 ("[Alny excep-
tion, whatever safeguards are provided, must be balanced with the public's need for
information and the benefits to be derived from public input into governmental deci-
sionmaking. Without a sufficient reason for an exception, none should be permitted
to upset the open meeting principle.").
186. Freir v. Independent School Dist. No. 197, 356 N.W.2d 724, 730 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984). See also Gemberling & Weissman, supra note 21, at 598 ("[A]s a matter of
public policy, the protection of personal data privacy must compete with other legiti-
mate social objectives, particularly public access to data that describes governmental
operations. The balance struck will, of necessity, be delicate and ephemeral."); cf. In
re Agerter, 353 N.W.2d 908, 913 (Minn. 1984) ("[A] protectable right of informa-
[Vol. 16
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When considered together, these two appellate court statements in-
dicate that the benefits of both the Open Meeting Law and the Data
Practices Act must be balanced against other equally important con-
siderations,' such as the right of privacy. Moreover, these statements
indicate that even though both the Open Meeting Law and the Data
Practices Act create a presumption of openness in government, this
presumption is not absolute and can be overcome when other public
policies are considered to be more important.187
Although there is support for the supreme court's conclusion in
Annandale Advocate that section 47 1.705, subdivision lb creates a data
privacy exception to the Open Meeting Law, the court does not ade-
quately address the problem of potential abuse of this exception.
The dissent, however, points out this lapse.188 The data privacy ex-
ception to the Open Meeting Law could be abused by public officials
using nonpublic data as a mere pretext to close a meeting. The
supreme court does point out justifiably, "[b]ecause the legislature
has accorded private or nonpublic status to very few types of data,
there is little danger of the doors of government being slammed
shut."89 While this may be true, it does not completely rule out the
possibility of public officials engaging in "pretextual discussions in-
volving non-public data mainly as a pretext to close [a] meeting." 190
Likewise, not all people would agree with the court's assertion that
"the legislature has accorded private or non-public status to very few
types of data."19 As one commentator has stated:
The Court's observation about the limited number of confidential-
ity provisions in the Data Practices Act is arguable. While the Court
regarded the Act as "not any more difficult to apply than other stat-
utes," observers are less sanguine. The Act sets forth a panoply of
classifications ranging from A to Z, arrest data to zoological garden
data, with plenty of other categories sandwiched in-between. The
statute has been viewed as an "imperfect mechanism to deal with
an extremely complex issue." Its bewildering classifications have
prompted another commentator to describe the Act as a "crazy-
quilt structure (that) .. . is simply too hard for most people to
tional privacy depends on a balancing of the competing interests of the individual in
keeping his or her intimate affairs private and the government's interest in knowing
what those affairs are when public concerns are involved.").
187. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
189. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 33.
190. Respondent's Brief at 20, Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale, 435
N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1989) (No. CX-87-1583). See also Note, supra note 48, at 409
("[D]espite statutorily prescribed limitations on the use of closed sessions, .. . offi-
cials may be tempted to discuss matters beyond the legitimate scope of the private
session.").
191. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 33.
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understand." ' 9 2
The Data Practices Act is confusing and has been so recognized by
others. As of the date of publication, there is a bill in the Minnesota
Senate Judiciary Committee which proposes to repeal the Act and
replace it with a completely new Uniform Information Practices
Code.93 Whether this or a similar bill will be enacted in the near
future is doubtful. But, the fact that a bill to repeal the Data Prac-
tices Act has been proposed indicates there is current dissatisfaction
with the complexities of the Act.
The potential for abuse of the data privacy exception to the Open
Meeting Law enunciated by the supreme court in Annandale Advocate
requires both the courts and the legislature to continue to analyze
this exception. The potential for abuse, however, does not in and of
itself mean that the exception should not be allowed. The same po-
tential for abuse exists for the attorney-client exception to the Open
Meeting Law when a governmental entity discusses litigation strategy
with its attorney.19 4 Yet both the courts and the legislature have
continued to allow this exception to exist, and it has not resulted in
"the doors of government being slammed shut." Rather, the poten-
tial for abuse calls to mind the reality that an open meeting law "ac-
complishes its purpose only as well as it ... defin[es] the exceptions
to the general policy in favor of openness as well as mandating the
general policy."t 95 Consequently, it is necessary to better define the
data privacy exception to the Open Meeting Law in order to limit its
potential for abuse to the greatest extent possible, keeping in mind
that some abuse is inherent in any exception.
One possible way of better defining the data privacy exception is
to indicate the specific procedure by which it may be invoked, either
through judicial, or preferably through legislative action. At the time
of this writing, a bill in the Minnesota House of Representatives Gov-
ernment Operations Committee takes this approach.t96 The bill,
which has already received two readings in the House, 19 7 states that
192. Tanick, supra note 23, at 23 (footnotes omitted).
193. S.F. 178, 76th Minn. Leg. 1989 (introduced by Senator Randolph W. Peter-
son). The title of the proposed bill is as follows: "A bill for an act relating to collec-
tion and dissemination of data; enacting the uniform information practice code;
repealing the government data practices act; prescribing penalties; proposing coding
for new law as Minnesota Statutes, chapter 13B; repealing Minnesota Statutes 1988,
sections 13.01 to 13.90." Id. An examination of this bill is beyond the scope of this
Comment, but it certainly deserves further consideration.
194. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
195. Tacha, supra note 45, at 194.
196. H.R. 1365, 76th Minn. Leg. (1989). The Governmental Operations Commit-
tee had the opportunity to act on the bill again when the House of Representatives
reconvened in February 1990.
197. The bill was read for a second time on April 17, 1989, after the House Judici-
ary Committee amended and adopted it. H.R. 1365, 76th Minn. Leg. (1989).
[Vol. 16
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"[b]efore closing a meeting, a public body shall provide the reason
that the meeting is to be closed and describe the subject to be
discussed."198
While requiring public officials to state both the reason for and
subject matter of a closed meeting in a prior open session would go
far to limit potential abuse, it may not go far enough. A good exam-
ple of a state statute which goes further and requires additional pro-
cedural steps to be followed in order to close a meeting is the
Virginia Freedom of Information Act.199 The Virginia Act requires
that the subject matter of closed meetings be carefully restricted,200
and that the members of the public body must in open session, im-
mediately following the conclusion of a closed session, certify that
only matters "lawfully exempted from open meeting requirements"
were discussed.201 The added procedural precautions contained in
the Virginia Freedom of Information Act appear likely to prevent all
but the worst abuses of the private data exception to the Minnesota
Open Meeting Law. These added procedures deserve further
consideration.
Besides additional procedures such as those contained in the Vir-
ginia Freedom of Information Act, there are other possible precau-
tions to consider as prerequisites to public bodies holding closed
198. See id. at 3.
199. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-344, 1-344.1 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
200. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-344.1 (Supp. 1989). In addition to the procedures pro-
posed in the bill currently in the Minnesota House of Representatives Governmental
Operations Committee, the Virginia Freedom of Information Act requires:
C. The public body holding... [a] closed meeting shall restrict its consider-
ation of matters during the closed portions only to those purposes specifi-
cally exempted from the provisions of this chapter.
D. At the conclusion of any.., closed meeting .... the public body holding
such meeting shall reconvene in open session immediately thereafter and
shall take a roll call or other recorded vote to be included in the minutes of
that body, certifying that to the best of the member's knowledge (i) only
public business matters lawfully exempted from open meeting requirements
.... and (ii) only such public business matters as were identified in the
motion by which the . . . closed meeting was convened were heard, dis-
cussed or considered in the meeting by the public body. Any member of the
public body who believes that there was a departure from the requirements
of subdivisions (i) and (ii) above, shall so state prior to the vote, indicating
the substance of the departure that, in his judgment, has taken place. The
statement shall be recorded in the minutes of the public body.
E. Failure to the certification required by subsection D, above, to receive
the affirmative vote of a majority of the members of the public body present
during a closed ... session shall not affect the validity or confidentiality of
such meeting with respect to matters considered therein in compliance with
the provisions of this chapter. The recorded vote and any statement made
in connection therewith, shall upon proper authentication, constitute evi-
dence in any proceeding brought to enforce this chapter.
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meetings. Other precautions to consider include, requiring closed
meetings to be tape-recorded, 2o 2 or relying on the electoral process
for citizens to express their approval or disapproval of how public
officials are using the data privacy exception to close meetings.203
Neither of these two possible precautionary procedures, however,
appear to be as effective as the other procedural precautions dis-
cussed above.
CONCLUSION
Annandale Advocate is a reasonable attempt by the Minnesota
Supreme Court to interpret ambiguous sections of both the Data
Practices Act and the Open Meeting Law. The court's determination
that the "final disposition of any disciplinary action" under section
13.43, subdivision 2 occurs when a public employee has exhausted
all of his or her appeal rights is reasonable despite the fact that the
court forgets to acknowledge that section 13.43, subdivision 4 of the
Data Practices Act allows private personnel data on individuals to
"be released pursuant to a court order."204 Still, this oversight by
the court is not fatal to its analysis and conclusion. The court was
addressing the issue of whether the lower courts had correctly inter-
preted the meaning of "final disposition" in section 13.43, subdivi-
sion 2 and not whether the courts had power to order the release of
private data.
The determination of the court that section 471.705, subdivision
lb creates a data privacy exception to the Open Meeting Law for the
202. The requirement that a public meeting be tape-recorded as a prerequisite to
closing it is not a new or novel concept to the Minnesota Open Meeting Law. For
example, the governing body of a public employer may close a meeting to discuss
labor negotiation strategies, but only if the meeting is tape-recorded and the tape is
preserved for two years after a contract is signed. MINN. STAT. § 471.705 (1)(a)
(1988). A more recent example relates to public hospitals. Under recently enacted
legislation, a public hospital or related organization "may hold a closed meeting to
discuss specific marketing activity and contract... where the hospital or organization
is in competition with health care providers that offer similar goods or services, and
where disclosure of information pertaining to those matters would cause harm to...
[its] competitive position ...." provided that the closed session is tape-recorded and
the tape is preserved for two years. MINN. STAT. § 144.581 (5) (Supp. 1989).
203. See Comment, supra note 56, at 274. The commentator points out that:
the individuals who are subject to the ... constraints [of the Open Meeting
Law] are either publicly-elected officials or are directly accountable to such
officials. Consequently, they are subject, either directly or indirectly, to the
electoral process. If the public does not have confidence in an official, it can
use the electoral process to remove him.
Id.
204. MINN. STAT. § 13.43, subd. 4 (1988). Chief Justice Popovich points out this
error in his dissent. See Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 37 ("[R]elease pursuant to
a court order is an exception to the Data Practices Act, and the majority does not
discuss the import of this provision.") (Popovich, J., dissenting).
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portions of governmental meetings in which data classified as non-
public by the Data Practices Act is discussed is also reasonable. The
court acknowledges, however, that there are two possible interpreta-
tions of section 471.705, subdivision lb. Thus, the supreme court
wisely calls on the legislature to clarify the statute if the legislature
disagrees with the interpretation chosen by the court.20 5
205. The legislature has already responded to the supreme court's interpretation
of § 471.705, subd. lb in Annandale Advocate by attempting to amend the statute. The
legislature was unable to pass any legislation in response to Annandale Advocate during
either the 1989 regular or special sessions. However, there were bills in both House
and Senate committees which had the opportunity to be acted upon when the legisla-
ture reconvened again in February 1990.
There is a bill in the House Governmental Operations Committee attempting to
modify § 13.43, subd. 2 of the Data Practices Act by making the following addition:
(b) For purposes of this subdivision, afinal disposition occurs when the
state agency, statewide system, or political subdivision makes its final deci-
sion about the disciplinary action, regardless of any later proceedings, in-
cluding appeals to boards, commissions, courts, or other bodies, other legal
actions, and arbitration and grievance proceedings.
H.R. 1365, 76th Leg., at 2 (1989) (emphasis added) (underscoring removed).
There is also another provision in the bill to modify § 471.705, the Open Meet-
ing Law, by adding the following provisions:
Before closing a meeting, a public body shall provide the reason that the
meeting is to be closed and describe the subject to be discussed.
Subd. ld. [CLOSING MEETING FOR PRELIMINARY CONSIDERA-
TION OF DISCIPLINARY MATTER.] A public body subject to this section
may close a meeting for preliminary consideration of specific allegations,
complaints, charges, or grounds for discipline, termination, or discharge
concerning an employee, volunteer, independent contractor, or student
who is subject to the authority of the public body. If the members conclude
that termination, discharge, or discipline of any nature may be warranted, all
further meetings or hearings must be open, including any formal action on
whether discipline, termination, or discharge will be imposed, except as
otherwise expressly provided by law. A motion or resolution proposing dis-
cipline, termination, or discharge may contain a recitation of specific com-
plaints or charges warranting the action. If at a meeting the public body
imposes discipline, termination, or discharge, the public body shall specify
the factual basis in a motion or resolution. The motion or resolution must
be public regardless of form. A meeting that could be closed under this
subdivision must be open to the public if the employee, volunteer, in-
dependent contractor, or student who is the subject of the meeting requests
it, unless the public body determines that third parties could be harmed in
cases of alleged sexual misconduct. In the case of a minor student, the re-
quest for an open meeting must be made by the student's parent or guard-
ian.
Subd. le. [CLOSING MEETING FOR EVALUATION OF EMPLOY-
EES.] A public body subject to this section may close a meeting for the
purpose of conducting a formal evaluation of an employee who is subject to
the authority of the public body. At the next open meeting of the public
body following the closed meeting at which an evaluation is conducted, the
public body shall report on the conclusions of the evaluation. A meeting
that could be closed under this subdivision must be open to the public if the
employee who is the subject of the evaluation requests it. A public body
1990]
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Hopefully, if the legislature amends either section 13.43 of the
Data Practices Act or section 471.705 of the Open Meeting Law, it
will do so in furtherance of the ends discussed by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Annandale Advocate. The holding in Annandale Ad-
vocate results from the necessary balancing of both the presumption
that openness in government leads to better government, and the
public policies of providing "substantial privacy protection to [the]
personnel data"206 of public employees and providing for "the effec-
tive and efficient administration of public bodies."207 The public
policies of privacy and efficiency are just as important as the public
policy of openness in government. All of these policies need to be
continually balanced and weighed against one another.
Richard C. Thrasher
may not close a meeting for the purposes of conducting an evaluation more
than twice in any one year with respect to the same employee.
Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added) (underscoring removed).
A bill considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee would modify § 13.43,
subd. 2 by adding the following:
(b) For purposes of this subdivision, there is final disposition of disci-
plinary action if no further action is pending before the body taking the
action and no appeal to that body is possible or the time for filing an appeal
to that body has passed. Final disposition of disciplinary action includes a
settlement concerning a complaint or charge that is agreed to by the subject
of the data.
S.F. 1086, 76th Minn. Leg., at 2 (1989) (underscoring removed).
This bill in the Senate also would modify § 471.705. But, the modifications con-
tained in the Senate version are substantially different from the ones contained in the
House version. (The current Senate version is similar to a former House version.)
The bill would modify § 471.705 by adding the following:
(c) Materials that contain not public data may be discussed or printed
copies distributed at a meeting required by section 13.43, subdivision 2, to
be open to the public if the portions discussed or distributed are substan-
tially related to an issue at a meeting required by subdivision 1 to be open to
the public. Sections 13.08 and 13.09 do not apply to the dissemination of
not public data in compliance with this subdivision.
Id. at 2-3.
Unlike in the House, the status of the bill in the Senate is uncertain because the
sponsor of the Senate bill, Glen Taylor, is resigning.
206. Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 29.
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